Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, Major General Vadim Skibitsky (all photos: RBC-Ukraine) Author: Ulyana Bezpalko
Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, Major General Vadim Skibitsky, in an interview with RBC-Ukraine, talks about Russia's plans at the front, the tactics and goals of Russian shelling and attacks by “shahids,” as well as about the participation of the DPRK in the war.
For several months now, Russia's main efforts have been focused on the Pokrovsk region. And although the occupation forces have managed to get within a few kilometers of the city, their advance there appears to have slowed in recent weeks. Moscow has achieved slightly more results recently on the battlefield in the Kursk region, where the enemy, with the support of North Korean soldiers, has been trying to push out our units for six months.
At the same time, the Russians launch swarms of “shahids” every night at the rear areas of Ukraine and, less frequently and in smaller quantities, missiles. The target of these attacks is our critical infrastructure, energy, gas transportation system, military facilities and defense industry enterprises, clarifies Major General Vadim Skibitsky.
In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense spoke about how Russia has changed its approach to shelling and what the enemy is planning at the front.
– Given the course of this war, given that the Russians also had many failures and perhaps they were not able to achieve all of their goals, how would you assess whether Putin's goals, objectives and ambitions in the war have changed over these three years?
– If we talk about the strategic plans of the Russian Federation, they have remained unchanged. This is also written in their documents, which they developed to plan the further development and combat potential of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. This is a complete occupation or complete control, if they were not able to occupy the territory of our state at once, in order to have a very powerful ally first of all. In their documents, they already now determine that the leadership in Ukraine and Ukraine as a whole must be neutral or pro-Russian.
This is the change that occurred after the start of the large-scale invasion. At the initial stage, they planned and thought that they would be able to capture the entire territory of Ukraine in a very short time. But after the fighting began, after they felt the resistance of our people, our state, the plans began to change. The plans of the Russian leadership are being adjusted all the time. Today, the main goal that has been defined by the Russian Federation for 2025 is to capture the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, to carry out the tasks of the so-called “special military operation” of the Russian Federation, to maintain control over the territories that were captured (Kherson, Zaporizhia regions and directly occupied Crimea).
But if we talk about the Kremlin's essential, global plans, they have remained unchanged since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992. Because taking control and having direct influence on our state has been one of the Kremlin's main goals for many years. Ukraine is a powerful defense-industrial complex, industry, sufficient human resources of the Slavic population, which has a similar language and significant historical achievements over this entire period. And besides, it is a large territory that would allow the Russian Federation to create a so-called buffer zone on its borders with NATO countries.
– You mentioned that Russian plans are being adjusted. How were their primary plans, which they had drawn up before the start of the large invasion, broken?
– The first is Kyiv. They failed to capture the capital in three days. The second is Mariupol. This is a hero city that actually delayed the entire group of enemy troops, which at that time was supposed to reach our southern territories and then move north to join the group of Russian troops that was heading for Kharkov, with the goal of completely encircling our troops in the zone of the then Joint Forces Operation. This is the first stage that the Russian Federation failed to fully implement.
The third stage is, accordingly, the liberation of our territories that were captured in the first days of the war. The Kharkov region and the city of Kherson completely destroyed all of Russia's plans to advance its troops deep into our territory.
The next stage is the military actions that are currently taking place along the entire line of combat contact. After all, the enemy is constantly postponing the deadlines for fulfilling its combat missions due to the actions of our troops. The Ukrainian Defense Forces are holding their positions, pushing the enemy back and not allowing them to fulfill the plans that the Kremlin has outlined for itself for a month, for six months, for a year.
– But why, despite the fact that they constantly have some kind of failures, plans are being shifted, and are already being stretched out for years, do they still not give up on continuing military operations and the war?
– You see, Putin needs a result. There is no result of the so-called “special military operation”. And what is this result? It is “providing assistance”, as they said at the beginning, “liberating” the Luhansk and Donetsk regions from the “Ukrainian occupation”, within their administrative borders. The task set for the Russian occupiers has not yet been completed. The entire Luhansk region is not occupied, and with the pace of offensive actions that the Russian Federation has, they are unlikely to be able to complete the task for the Donetsk region in the near future.
– Some military observers and OSINT channels have noted that in recent weeks, in their assessment, there has been a slight decline in the number of attacks, the number of assault actions, and the dynamics of the Russian advance at the front. Is this true or not?
– Indeed, we are recording a decrease in the activity of military actions, and above all a decrease in clashes. But their troop grouping still remains powerful – more than 620 thousand servicemen of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, who are deployed in our temporarily occupied territories, in the Kursk region. Regrouping is taking place, and the combat losses of the Russian Federation are being replenished. The weather also has a direct impact on the conduct of military actions.
If we are talking about the land component, it is approximately 620 thousand, and more than 200 thousand are the assault units that participate in combat operations and are on the front line. In addition, there are 35 thousand servicemen of the Russian Guard who provide support to the occupation authorities, protect the most important facilities in the temporarily occupied territories and, in fact, according to their plans, if necessary, can perform tasks in the second echelon of the enemy when organizing defense.
It is also necessary to add those troops that provide logistical support, units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, aviation, which is not directly based, for example, in combat zones, but is used to carry out combat strikes. After all, the aggressor currently uses more than 20 airfields, air bases on Russian territory to carry out both bombing and missile strikes on our territory.
But one should not think that the enemy's plans change due to the decrease in combat activity. After all, they use this time to develop plans for further offensive, train personnel, replenish ammunition and, accordingly, prepare for further assault and offensive actions.
We analyze based on how active the campaign to recruit servicemen to the armed forces of the Russian Federation is now. By the way, in January they fulfilled the recruitment plans by 107%. This issue remains relevant, and the Russian authorities have no problem with staffing the troops and replenishing losses.
Secondly, they have clearly defined for themselves the most critical and most urgent directions of military operations. First of all, this is the Pokrovsk direction, Toretsk and Chasov Yar for completing all the operations that they have planned. In addition, this is Kupyansk. We know the plans that the Russian Federation has set for itself, including the possibility of conducting assault and offensive operations in both the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.
– So there really are such plans and such a threat remains?
– Yes, the threat remains. Let's look at the statements made by the leadership of the Russian Federation. Kremlin representatives have repeatedly stated that both the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions are “new territories” of Russia that are “inscribed in the Russian constitution” and that they will do everything to ensure that these territories are under Russian control.
– And if we talk about the Dnipropetrovsk region, is there a threat of some offensive actions from Russia in the direction of the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region?
– Firstly, let's proceed from whether the Russian Federation will fulfill the task of reaching the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region. In case of Russia's success, the threat of any assault actions, reconnaissance actions increases, and in addition, this reduces the combat radius of the enemy's artillery and multiple launch rocket systems to strike our infrastructure.
– You also said that they are doing okay with recruiting volunteers. Are these people who volunteer, or is it voluntary-compulsory, are they taken from prisons? Who are these people?
– This is a very interesting picture. In 2025, according to Russian plans, approximately 30% of those people who allegedly voluntarily join the army will be those people who are under investigation, in prison, or serving a suspended sentence. And this problem is already arising for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – what to do with these people, how to work with them. In 2024, such a contingent – they are called special contingent – was 15%, and now it will be 30%.
However, they are offered high wages, a very large down payment, which they receive for signing the first contract. In most regions of Russia, this is more than 2 million rubles, meaning that a Russian serviceman who signs a contract, depending on the region, can receive from 20 to 25 thousand dollars literally at a time.
For the Russian Federation, these are very large sums. As a result, we see that in 2024, the plan for staffing through recruitment for contract service was not just fulfilled, but exceeded by at least 10 thousand servicemen. For our understanding, this amount, firstly, includes one-time payments from the Russian Ministry of Defense for signing a contract, payments from local authorities, payments from enterprises where this serviceman works. After all, for each region of the Russian Federation, for each subject of the Russian Federation, a clear plan has been established for how many they should recruit into the armed forces. And Russia is subject to very serious responsibility if this plan is not fulfilled.
– What are Russia’s plans for 2025 in terms of troop recruitment?
– If we talk about plans, it is 343 thousand servicemen, we are talking specifically about recruitment under contract. But from the experience of 2024, we know that these plans change – to the upside. For example, last year the goal was to recruit approximately 375-380 thousand, then the plans changed to 430 thousand, and as a result they recruited 440 thousand servicemen under contract.
Here it is necessary to understand that almost 80% of those who are recruited under contract are used to replenish combat losses. Accordingly, if such rates of offensive actions and losses that the enemy has are maintained, these plans will mainly allow replenishing losses on the battlefield.
In addition, Moscow has current plans to form new formations and units. First of all, in the Moscow, Leningrad, Southern and Central Military Districts, where the creation of new formations and units continues today and will continue throughout the year. Formations – for example, divisions – are formed on the basis of existing brigades that directly participate in combat operations on our territory. This is, in essence, completing the brigade to the size of a division. And it is also assumed that personnel who will sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense will be involved in these activities.
– Every night, the Russians have probably been launching UAVs since September – some of them are “shahids”, some of them are some kind of “dummy”. But still, this flock flies every night to the territory of Ukraine, to different regions. It is clear that they do not fly to nowhere, they are probably given some targets. Why do these drones fly every night, what is the target and what objects are they usually aimed at?
– Let's start with why they fly every night. Firstly, the Russians have significantly increased the production of unmanned aerial vehicles of various types. If earlier, in 2023 – early 2024, we knew only one “shahed”, then “Geran-1”, “Geran-2” and that's it. Today, the range of these unmanned aerial vehicles is so large that it is not always possible to count them on the fingers of one hand: “Geran-1”, “Geran-2”, “Harpy”, “Gerbera”, “Parody” and others.
At the same time, the types of drones that are currently in use include combat strike, reconnaissance, decoys, which are drones but without a combat payload, there are imitation targets. In fact, all this as a whole simply overloads our air defense system. It is very difficult to distinguish where a drone with a warhead is flying, and where – without it.
Secondly, regarding the production of unmanned aerial vehicles on the territory of the Russian Federation. This is Izhevsk, this is Yelabuga, this is the Kalashnikov concern. Now they have significantly increased the production of unmanned aerial vehicles. And this is what allows them to use 150 to 200 unmanned aerial vehicles in one strike.
By the way, they plan to increase the number of launch pads from which they will launch unmanned aerial vehicles over our territory. According to the calculations of the Russian command, if the plans for the first half of the year are fulfilled, they will be able to launch approximately 500 unmanned aerial vehicles simultaneously.
Next – about possible targets. The targets have not changed. I remember the documents of the Russian Federation, which date back to the fall of 2023, where the main targets for which unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise and ballistic missiles will be used were clearly defined. This is the control system of the Armed Forces, the Defense Forces, this is everything that concerns aviation and our airfields. These are the most critical elements of our infrastructure, including the energy system, the gas transportation system – what we are seeing now. And one of the priorities is our defense industry enterprises – where weapons are manufactured, where we have increased the production of many types of weapons, ammunition, unmanned vehicles and systems.
The main priorities remain. We have already seen attacks on the energy sector, on the thermal power plant – you remember how powerful the attacks were in the Kharkiv region to knock out the entire system of heat supply to our population. There were attacks on the energy system, and the aggressor somewhat changed his tactics and approaches, which he is now also very actively using. This is an approach that concerns clear definition and planning – the so-called targeting, in order to achieve the greatest effect.
And lately our gas transportation system and our gas fields have been suffering. The enemy understands that this is what is going for our population, to provide our gas for our needs. Lately they have been trying to destroy precisely this ability of Ukraine.
– As for the attacks on the gas transportation system. Do they want to simply leave us without gas or do they want to force us to somehow restore the transit of their gas?
– It is possible, but, for example, if we talk about the Lviv region, the strikes were carried out on our underground gas storage facilities where gas is stored. There have already been three strikes on our fields in order to deprive us of the opportunity to extract gas. And at the same time, the strikes are carried out on the ground infrastructure – on compressor stations, gas pumping stations – on that which allows either to lift gas to the surface, if it is in storage, or to pump gas from our depths.
And this is also a very powerful element of pressure not only on the Ukrainian government, but also on our population. Look at what is happening in Odessa, when it is almost completely without electricity. I remember 2023, when you come to Odessa, walk along Deribasovskaya, and everything is humming from generators to provide electricity. This is very difficult for the population. And the Russians expect that this will influence the population. And the Russian Federation will definitely use this in terms of information to destabilize the situation.
– Once, during the 2022-2023 heating season, the Russians first launched these “X-s” or “calibers” once every 7 days, during the daytime, 50-100 missiles at our energy facilities. Then this interval increased to 10 days, then to 14 days. At night, they also launched – not every night – “shahids”, which also finished off our energy sector.
The systemic nature of their strikes that they carried out in March last year was more or less clear. They relied on regularity, mass scale and short intervals between attacks. And they really did create a difficult situation for us in 3-4 weeks – there was little light.
Now they are launching “shaheeds”, and they are using a minimum of missiles to strike our energy sector. What is their plan and intention now? Maybe they decided against leaving us without electricity and making a blackout here? I don't understand their intention.
– And the military intelligence of Ukraine understands. Firstly, the strikes have become combined. Secondly, both the Russians and we have learned to plan the destruction of objects normally, while using fewer missiles and unmanned aerial systems to achieve the maximum result. Thirdly, those priority objects are selected, the destruction of which will have the greatest effect.
Moreover, the strikes are not just combined – they are coordinated in time: missiles, drones, missiles again. This overloads the air defense system. The Russians understand what our capabilities are, where our air defense systems are located, in order to bypass them.
If 70 missiles were launched before, they all flew along the same route: they entered through the Luhansk region and headed straight to Kyiv. Now you will not see such a picture. Missiles enter from any direction, fly across the territory of Ukraine, bypass all air defense systems and areas and try to reach the target.
Therefore, now, on the contrary, everything has become much more complicated. We need to conduct maneuvers of air defense forces and assets. Secondly, we understand when the Russians conduct reconnaissance of objects, what objects they are monitoring. After the strike, they immediately conduct additional reconnaissance and in a short time repeat strikes. This is, in essence, finishing off those objects that they did not hit during the first and second strikes.
At the same time, when they were striking with 70 missiles, the effectiveness was not always high. Our air defense system worked very well when it had a sufficient number of anti-aircraft missiles. In addition, I repeat, these were simple direct strikes. Now it is completely different.
Plus, if back then they could use 20-30 unmanned aerial vehicles in one strike, now it is 150. This approach by the enemy requires a completely different attention from the air defense system and this is a completely different load on the system. Previously, they launched drones late in the evening and they flew until the morning. And now they can launch drones starting in the morning. The latest trends are launching drones in the evening, which begin to reach targets on our territory starting at 11 p.m. and until the morning. That is, this is already happening continuously, which increases the level of the existing threat.
– And what about the Russians with the production of missiles?
– If we compare it with 2024, the production of missiles has not increased significantly. But there has been a redistribution. They have started to produce more X-101 cruise missiles, but less for the Kalibr system, having assessed where they are more effective. The enemy also plans to increase the production of Kinzhals and ballistic missiles for Iskander – these are the weapons that have proven themselves to be more effective. But if we talk in absolute figures, the growth in missile production compared to 2024 is no more than 1.2 times, and in some cases – one and a half times, if we are talking specifically about high-precision missile weapons.
– Tell us, what new information is there about soldiers from the DPRK? Are they at the front, no, almost none? In what numbers? And how would you characterize them as soldiers?
– Since mid-December 2024, they have been directly involved in combat operations. At the first stage, they had heavy losses. They were then withdrawn for recovery, for rest. The losses are about 4 thousand out of 11. These are very large losses for this period. However, from about the first ten days of February, they began to be actively used again on the front in the Kursk region.
But that's not even what's important. We now need to get information on whether additional forces will be sent, whether there will simply be a rotation or replenishment of losses by other servicemen who will be brought in to replace the dead and wounded.
And the main thing – both for North Korea and for the countries of the Far Eastern region – is that the DPRK military personnel have gained real experience of participating in combat operations with new technologies, with new tactics of warfare, with the use of artillery in combination with unmanned aerial vehicles, with the widespread use of FPV drones, new electronic warfare systems and new reconnaissance systems. This is a very powerful experience that few countries in the world have: we, the Russians, now – also North Korea, and that's it. Among many of our partners, there is already a request for this experience.
– Were these North Korean soldiers seen only in battles in the Kursk region, or somewhere else on other sections of the front?
– Directly recorded – only in the Kursk region. But individual weapons systems from the DPRK, we are talking primarily about 170-mm artillery systems, multiple launch rocket systems from North Korea, we are already observing on our territory. Are there their instructors there? Apparently not, since the Russians have specially created a training center in the artillery school, where the crews of the armed forces of the Russian Federation are trained to use North Korean systems.
We had confirmed information that DPRK military personnel provided assistance and participated in planning strikes using ballistic missiles of their production, because this is a more complex system, but this took place from Russian territory.
– Whose initiative was it overall to send North Korean troops to help Russia in the battles? Was it an initiative that came from Russia, which asked for help. Or did the leader of the DPRK want it himself, for some reasons of his own – for example, to gain experience?
– It is difficult to say, since both sides are interested in such cooperation. They signed a strategic agreement, by which they committed to help each other. They benefit from this – both Russia and the DPRK. The Russian Federation will get what they need to wage war, and North Korea will increase its combat potential.
When I talk about North Korea, I am talking about technology, new types of weapons, aviation, replenishment of ammunition. They give Russia their old ammunition, but in return they have launched the production of new ones and are simply updating their arsenals. And the most valuable thing that Pyongyang gets is technology and the experience of military personnel in the introduction of modern combat operations.
Russia, in turn, received what it needs in the war. Ammunition of various calibers, including 122 mm, 152 mm, rockets for multiple launch rocket systems. This is what the Russian Federation lacks, since Moscow cannot significantly increase the production of these ammunition by its military-industrial complex.
We are now recording the supply of ammunition from the DPRK to Russian territory. They are sent both by sea and by rail, then sent to arsenals located closer to Ukraine (Moscow District, Southern Military District), and from there – directly to the battlefield.
– Something regularly flies into Russian refineries. We regularly see in the news that something flew into one refinery, and someone attacked another. Do we have an understanding of what share of their oil refining capacity was knocked out as a result of these damages and arrivals?
– Yes. We are currently working according to NATO standards. NATO standards clearly provide for certain stages of such work. This includes analysis of centers of gravity, and targeting or defining targets, the most critical places where strikes need to be carried out. Then analysis of the results of strikes. This is what forms the whole picture of what effect we have achieved. We are trying to achieve the greatest effect on those critical objects that are selected for destruction.
And in fact, we are not only talking about oil refineries or fuel and lubricant storage bases. We have another range of targets that we choose to strike. If we are talking about military facilities, our task is to destroy them. If we are talking about the military-industrial complex, the task is either to destroy or interrupt the production line, that is, to postpone this production for a certain period of time. Since it is very difficult to completely destroy an object, and even more so – such powerful military-industrial complex facilities that are on the territory of Russia. After all, these are very large and large enterprises. However, we determine those critical elements that must be struck.
These are also other military facilities, for example, the same enemy air defense facilities, because without their destruction we will not be able to carry out our strikes – the so-called deep strike. This is a set of measures that is carried out by all our Defense Forces under the coordination of the General Staff.
And we have a result – there is a reduction, for example, in production at oil refineries. It is not as significant as we would like, but it still has an impact. This reduction affects the supply of critical fuels and lubricants for enemy troops and aviation.
The results are reflected in the enemy's military facilities, for example, the Russian Black Sea Fleet. We have forced all combat ships and submarines to move completely from the territory of Crimea directly to the territory of Russia. We are also talking about striking at places where ammunition, guided air bombs and missiles are stored, which does not allow the Russians to fully use their combat potential. That is, oil refineries, places where fuel and lubricants are stored – this is only one of the groups of targets that must be hit to reduce the combat potential and ensure the grouping of Russian troops on our territory.
– During these three years of the great war, were there any operations that the Russians planned, but which they managed to prevent, not allow?
– It is too early to talk about this, because most of the operations that were planned to be carried out and did not take place were operations in the second half of 2024 – early 2025. The timely exposure of these plans occurred only because all military intelligence assets were working in one direction, and, as a result, we were able to take adequate measures. We became aware of the enemy's preparation and development of a direct plan for offensive actions in at least two directions, which did not take place in the second half of 2024 – early 2025.
Along with this, there is another important point: due to the fact that we can promptly expose these plans, a regrouping and a corresponding reaction from our forces is carried out. Now the most critical direction – the direction of concentration of the main efforts of the Russian Federation – is the Donetsk region, in particular – the southwestern part of the Donetsk region, Pokrovsk and the entire agglomeration of our settlements, so that in case of success the Russians could continue offensive actions in different directions. Including in the direction of the Dnepropetrovsk region, to the north – in the direction of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk.
But even after the plans of the Russian Federation become known and they understand that they will no longer be able to carry out this or that operation, this does not mean that they refuse to carry out such an operation. They carry out regrouping, other preparatory measures, the troops begin to engage in combat training, preparation specifically for the implementation of those plans that were developed. Therefore, the exposure of the enemy's plans does not yet mean a complete refusal of the Russian Federation to implement them.