Since September, Russia has been attacking Ukraine with shahids every day (photo: RBC-Ukraine, Vitaly Nosach) Author: Ulyana Bezpalko
For more than six months now, Russia has been launching dozens, if not hundreds, of “shahids” and other UAVs at Ukraine every night. What is Moscow's plan and tactics, how many of these drones are they producing, and whether Ukraine's air defense will be able to counter enemy attacks without the United States – in the article by RBC-Ukraine military and political observer Ulyana Bezpalko.
CONTENT:
- How many Shaheds and other UAVs does Russia produce?
- What is the essence of Russia's tactics?
- What will happen to Ukrainian air defense after US support stops
For more than six months, Russia has been testing new tactics of attacks with “shaheds” and other long-range UAVs. Since September, the enemy has been shelling the rear areas of Ukraine with drones every day – mostly every night.
On the night of February 22-23, Russia was able to launch a “record” 267 different long-range UAVs against Ukraine. However, this is probably not the limit. By the end of the first half of 2025, Moscow wants to reach the figure of 500 UAVs per attack, the GUR says.
The enemy has relied on mass, regularity, and changing routes and altitudes. And unfortunately, this tactic is sometimes effective.
How many Shaheds and other UAVs does Russia produce?
Russia was able to adopt the technology of producing “shaheds” from Iran, scale it up and differentiate it. If a year ago the main long-range drone with which the enemy attacked the Ukrainian rear areas was the Shahed-136 or the so-called “Geran-2”, now the range of weapons has expanded.
Now, during one attack, the aggressor launches, in addition to the “classic Shaheds”, also its similar version “Harpy-A1”, and sometimes its simplified modification “Geran-1”. In addition, drones-“dummy” “Parody” without a warhead and “Gerbera”, which can carry both a small warhead and act as a false target, are launched.
“A swarm of these “G” flies to our territory every night. And unfortunately, they can churn them out in large quantities. They are relatively cheap, they fly, they have all the necessary elements. And these “Parodies” – those that are essentially parodies of “shaheeds” – they can also assemble more than a thousand a month,” says one of the interlocutors in the Defense Forces.
According to RBC-Ukraine, Moscow is currently capable of producing approximately 900 “shaheds” / “Geranium-2” per month, at least a thousand “Parodias” and more than 2 thousand “Harpies” and “Gerberas” (80% are “Gerberas” and 20% are “Harpies”).
Russia has been attacking Ukraine every night for over six months (photo: PMC “Vostok” facebook)
These production volumes explain how Russia manages to maintain the regularity and mass character of its drone attacks. Since September, the aggressor has launched at least 1,300 UAVs against our regions every month, and in some months – more than 2,000.
The enemy can now launch these drones from seven locations: from the Chauda ranges in occupied Crimea and Navlya in the Bryansk region, and from the Khalino airfields in the Kursk region, Primorsko-Akhtarsk in the Krasnodar region, Orel-Yuzhny, Shatalovo in the Smolensk region and Millerovo in the Rostov region. According to RBC-Ukraine, the Kremlin plans to open five more sites by mid-2025 in order to reach a “throughput” of 500 UAVs per attack.
“Shatalovo is one of the last sites that were added during the winter. It is possible to trace how with the addition of this seventh location the number of “shaheeds” launched per night has increased,” one of the sources explained.
What is the essence of Russia's tactics?
One of the features of the new tactics used by the enemy is mass. Moreover, among this swarm of a hundred or two hundred UAVs, the percentage of false targets – drones without warheads can reach 50. However, neither on radars nor during combat operations of air defense forces is it possible to distinguish whether it is an attack UAV or a simple “dummy”. That is why both the first and the second need to be shot down. This, as a result, places an additional burden on mobile fire groups and air defense.
“These “Parodiya” type dummy missiles usually either just fly, their flight range runs out and they fall somewhere in a field. They can also be jammed by electronic warfare and they also fall somewhere during landing. What is listed in Air Force reports as “location lost” are, as a rule, these very same dummy missiles that fell somewhere and did not explode,” said one of the sources in military circles.
Another peculiarity of Russian tactics is that the launch of “shaheeds” is carried out in portions from early evening from different locations. As a result, while enemy UAVs begin to fly up to our borders and head to their assigned target, combat work on them and the alarm begins in the evening and often ends closer to the morning. Moreover, sometimes the aggressor combines “shaheeds” attacks with missile fire, which begins in the morning, to achieve an even greater effect and an even greater burden on our air defense. For example, this was the case during today's shelling.
The regularity of alarms and explosions exhausts not only the Air Force personnel, but also psychologically and morally exhausts the civilian population. This, according to the Kremlin's plan, is obviously supposed to make the Ukrainians more compliant.
Most of the hits on long-range UAVs and “shahids” are caused by the work of mobile fire teams (photo: GettyImages)
Fourthly, due to this mass character combined with frequent changes in flight routes, enemy UAVs manage to fly into large cities and sometimes hit their assigned targets. Another trick that the aggressor resorts to is flying drones at extremely low altitudes (less than 50 meters), for example, over river beds. At this time, they disappear from radars and are difficult to track.
The targets of enemy attacks remain unchanged. These are mainly military facilities, defense industry enterprises, the energy system, in particular substations, and the gas transportation system.
What will happen to Ukrainian air defense after US support stops
A series of unpleasant news from the US, which allegedly suspended the supply of weapons and the transfer of intelligence data, caused a stir in society not only about what awaits us at the front. But also about whether Ukraine will be able to shoot down and generally see what and from where the aggressor attacks us every day. Simply put, if a MiG-31K rises into the Russian sky and launches a “Kinzhal”, will the Air Force know about it? If enemy UAVs fly from Chauda – will the Air Defense Forces know about it and, most importantly, will they have what to shoot them down with?
Regarding the ability of our air defense to hit enemy targets – this question should be divided into two parts. If the US stops supplying aid, after some time the Air Force will really find it more difficult to shoot down the missile weapons with which Russia attacks us. Especially scarce may be the anti-aircraft missiles for the Patriot in the MSE version, which can shoot down ballistics.
“It could also potentially become difficult for aircraft that launch Western missiles. For example, StormShadow / SCALP. And in general, all the work of HIMARS and work on the territory of the Russian Federation or occupied territories, where satellite coordinates are needed. Other countries also have satellites, for example, France. But the US has significantly more of them,” explained one of the interlocutors.
German Gepard anti-aircraft gun, which is used to destroy “shahideen” (photo: RBC-Ukraine, Vitaly Nosach)
However, when it comes to defeating long-range drones, Ukraine is considerably less dependent on the United States, both in terms of equipment and in terms of ammunition or ammunition for them. As Russia has increased the number of drones it has launched, the Air Force has learned to counter them with cheaper and less scarce means.
Currently, most long-range drones are shot down by mobile fire teams armed with large-caliber machine guns such as the DShK, Browning or Canik, MANPADS, anti-aircraft guns, including the Soviet ZU-23-2 or German Gepard. Also, a significant share of enemy drones can be “extinguished” by electronic warfare, small aircraft, and helicopters. The last to counter enemy UAVs are short- or medium-range air defense systems, which the US has given us.
As for the ability of our air defense to “see” targets, the situation is also optimistic. Three sources in military-political circles explained that Ukraine received data on flights of Russian fighters, launches of cruise and ballistic missiles or long-range drones not only from the United States, but also from other sources, in particular from NATO centers. They, in turn, did not stop providing Ukraine with this information. Therefore, as RBC-Ukraine sources convince, the possible demarche of the Trump administration in the field of intelligence will not affect the ability of our air defense to “see”.